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Non-technical Summary 
Governments employ different instruments to support private R&D activities in order to 
increase firms’ R&D efforts and innovative performance. The most important measure used 
by the German Federal Government to fund R&D in private businesses is the so-called Direct 
R&D Project Funding (DPF). This paper contributes to the discussion of the effects and 
effectiveness of DPF as an innovation policy instrument by empirically analyzing the impact 
of DPF grants on firm’s R&D input as well as on R&D output.  
In the analysis I allow for heterogeneous effects to a certain extent in two dimensions: firm’s 
DPF history and DPF grant size. Previous research reveals that the subsidization of firms via 
the DPF scheme shows a certain level of continuity. I investigate whether this rather stable 
pattern of program participation has an impact on the effectiveness of the scheme, i.e. whether 
the continuity of funding can be justified by its higher impacts. A second focus is set on the 
role of the grant size. Previous research for Ireland shows that the effects of grants on R&D 
input vary by grant size. This relationship is analyzed for the DPF grants in Germany. In 
addition, the effects on R&D output are examined to verify whether the public money is 
translated successfully into new products.  
The empirical analysis is based on an annual innovation survey which is the German part of 
the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). This data is merged with a database comprising of 
information on subsidized projects in order to identify a firm’s subsidy status for each year. 
The sample consists of over 8,500 firm-year observations covering the manufacturing and 
knowledge-intensive service sectors in the time period from 1994 to 2005. A non-parametric 
matching approach with multiple treatments is employed in the first step to provide insights 
into the impact of R&D grants on firm-financed R&D inputs, namely private R&D 
expenditures. In the second step the effect on R&D output, namely sales with products new to 
the market is examined, distinguishing the effect with respect to firm’s DPF history and DPF 
grant size.  
Overall a positive effect of DPF grants on R&D input and also on output is found. Thus the 
main policy goal of the DPF scheme i.e. to increase private investment in R&D is being 
achieved. However, not every grant has the same effect. The analysis provides evidence that 
(at least) the effect varies with firm’s history of subsidies and grant size. Besides the necessity 
of a minimum grant size, the effect of private R&D increases with the frequent receipt of 
grants. For analyzing the effects of public grants on a firm’s R&D output, R&D expenditures 
are disentangled in R&D which would have been spent in the absence of the grant and 
publicly induced R&D, including the grant and the effect on private R&D expenditures. 
Basically both types of R&D are equally productive in terms of the generation of products 
and services new to the market. In addition, subsidy-based R&D is used equally efficiently by 
first time and frequent participants for generating innovative output. For the statement that a 
rather stable pattern of program participation leads to a lower effectiveness of the instrument 
no evidence has been found. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze (Summary in German) 
In den meisten OECD-Ländern werden die Forschungsaktivitäten der Unternehmen durch den 
Staat gefördert. Dabei bedienen sich die Länder verschiedener Instrumente, die von 
Zuschüssen für konkrete FuE-Projekte über steuerliche FuE-Anreize bis zu vergünstigten 
Darlehen reichen. Ziel ist es, die FuE-Anstrengungen der Wirtschaft zu erhöhen, um so die 
Innovationskraft zu stärken. In Deutschland nimmt die direkte FuE-Projektförderung (DPF) 
die dominierende Rolle innerhalb der staatlichen finanziellen Förderung von FuE ein. In 
dieser Studie werden die Effekte der DPF auf den FuE-Input und -Output von Unternehmen 
empirisch untersucht. Eine Erhöhnung der FuE-Ausgaben muss nicht zwangsläufig zu mehr 
Output führen, z.B. aufgrund der Durchführung von risikoreicheren Projekten oder steigender 
Löhne der FuE-Mitarbeiter. 
Es wurde in einer früheren Untersuchung der DPF gezeigt, dass die Beteiligung von 
Unternehmen an dieser Förderung zu einem erheblichen Maße kontinuierlich über die Zeit 
erfolgt. Die sich daraus ergebende Frage ist, ob diese stabile Teilnahme Auswirkungen auf die 
Effektivität des Instruments hat. Des Weiteren hat eine Analyse für Irland gezeigt, dass die 
Wirkung der Förderung auf die FuE-Ausgaben mit der Höhe der Fördermittel variiert. In der 
vorliegenden Untersuchung wird daher berücksichtigt, dass die Effekte möglicherweise durch 
zwei Faktoren beeinflusst werden: die Teilnahmehistorie des Unternehmens an der Förderung 
und die Höhe des Zuschusses.  
Die empirische Analyse basiert auf dem Mannheimer Innovationspanel, das eine jährliche 
Unternehmensumfrage zum Innovationsverhalten der deutschen Wirtschaft ist. Diese Daten 
wurden mit Informationen über die innerhalb der DPF geförderten Projekten angereichert. 
Der Datensatz besteht aus 8.500 Beobachtungen aus den Jahren 1994 bis 2005, die sowohl 
das verarbeitende Gewerbe als auch die wissensintensiven Dienstleistungen einschließen.  
Insgesamt wird ein positiver Effekt von öffentlichen Zuschüssen auf die 
unternehmensfinanzierten FuE-Aufwendungen als Maß für den FuE-Input festgestellt. Jedoch 
weist nicht jeder Zuschuss die gleiche Wirkung auf. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der Effekt 
(zumindest) mit der Unternehmenserfahrung hinsichtlich der DPF und der Höhe des 
Zuschusses variiert. Der Zuschuss sollte eine Mindestgröße aufweisen um einen signifikante 
Erhöhung der FuE-Aufwendungen zu bewirken. Außerdem steigt der positive Effekt mit dem 
regelmäßigen Erhalt der Förderung. Für die Untersuchung der Effekte auf den FuE-Output 
werden die FuE-Aufwendungen in zwei Komponenten aufgeteilt: (i) FuE-Aufwendungen, die 
auch ohne Förderung getätigt worden wären, und (ii) durch die Förderung induzierten FuE-
Aufwendungen, d.h. der Förderbetrag plus die zusätzlich aufgewendete eigenfinanzierte FuE. 
Es zeigt sich insgesamt, dass beide Teile gleich effektiv hinsichtlich der Generierung und des 
Umsatzanteils von Marktneuheiten sind. Damit trägt die Förderung tatsächlich zur Steigerung 
der Innovationskraft bei. Außerdem werden die FuE-Aufwendungen, die der Förderung 
zugeschrieben werden können, gleich produktiv von Erstteilnehmen und regelmäßigen 
Teilnehmern an der DPF eingesetzt. Die Ergebnisse geben somit keine Anzeichen dafür, dass 
die regelmäßige Teilnahme von Unternehmen an der DPF eine negative Auswirkung auf die 
Effektivität des Instrumentes hätte. 
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1 Introduction 
Investing in R&D is of great importance for the innovative potential and competitiveness of a 
knowledge-based economy. However, the public good characteristics of R&D lead to positive 
external effects because knowledge cannot be completely appropriated by the R&D 
conducting firm and thus leaks to other firms who increases the social returns but reduces 
private returns. Thus the incentives for companies to conduct R&D on a level that would be 
desirable from a welfare point of view are too low (Arrow, 1962). A second reason for 
underinvestment in R&D is related to imperfect capital markets. Due to the inherent high 
level of uncertainty in R&D and asymmetric information between inventors and investors it 
might be difficult or costly for firms to finance R&D with external capital (Hall, 2002).  
Therefore, governments take action and employ different instruments to support private R&D 
activities, for example, via R&D grants, tax-based R&D incentives, or low interest loans. The 
most important tool used by the German government to fund R&D in private businesses is the 
so-called Direct R&D Project Funding (DPF). The objective of this scheme is to increase a 
firm’s R&D activities and to foster innovation in a number of pre-selected technology areas 
virtually covering all the main areas of modern technology (see, for example, BT-Drs., 1984; 
BMBF, 2004). The grants are awarded to R&D projects on a cost-sharing basis. Firms have to 
submit project proposals which are evaluated by the program managers with respect to their 
compliance with funding principles and eligibility criteria, including the level of technological 
advance and innovation potential. Up to 50 percent of the project costs are covered by the 
government. Thus, the funding directly reduces firms’ R&D costs.  
The challenge for the government is to select those projects which the firms would not have 
conducted without the grant. Based on the market failure arguments justifying the subsidies, 
as mentioned before, this means, more precisely, that the government needs to choose projects 
for which the private returns are too low and/or for which the financing cannot be realized 
otherwise. Since private returns as well as firm’s financing opportunities for a project – and 
thus the conduct of the project in the absence of the grant – are difficult to assess for the 
government, the risk of allocation failure exists. However, if the agency is able to identify 
these projects a stimulation effect is likely.  
Since private firms follow a profit-maximizing strategy, applying for a grant is attractive for 
the firms as long as application costs are low and the probability of receiving funding is high 
compared to alternative financing sources. On one hand the grant turns an unprofitable project 
in a profitable one or the money closes the funding gap for the project so that additional R&D 
activities can be undertaken by the firm. On the other hand the grant is seen as cheap money 
and taken to finance a project which would have also been conducted without public support. 
In this case the grant substitutes private for public R&D expenditures.  
This paper contributes to the discussion of the effects and effectiveness of DPF as an 
innovation policy instrument by empirically analyzing the impact of DPF grants on firm’s 
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R&D input but also on R&D output. The performance of the scheme is also important in the 
light of the goals for the EU set at the Lisbon and Barcelona European Councils which are, 
becoming the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world and 
increasing R&D spending to 3% of GDP by 2010, two-thirds of which should be funded by 
the private sector (Commission of the European Communities, 2000, 2002).  
In the analysis I allow for heterogeneous effects in two dimensions: firm’s DPF history and 
DPF grant size. Prior analysis of the DPF scheme reveals that the subsidization of firms via 
this instrument shows a certain level of continuity. The stability within the support scheme 
can be due to different reasons, like learning effects of prior participants, or the ‘needy’ 
projects being submitted by the same firms. On the other hand it is also conceivable that a 
long experience with public funding leads to a different behavior of the firm so that in 
particular frequent recipients take advantage of the grants and substitute otherwise self-
financed R&D by them. The question is whether the rather stable participation pattern has an 
impact on the effectiveness of the scheme. The government needs to select those projects 
which the firms would not have conducted without the grant. If some of these projects are 
conducted by the same firms over time it does not necessarily lead to a failure of the scheme. I 
cannot identify the specific reasons why the support scheme is rather stable in Germany in 
terms of its recipients. However, the aim of the paper is to investigate whether a firm’s 
subsidy history influences the effectiveness of the subsidies, i.e. whether this high level of 
continuity can be justified by its realized effects. A second focus is set on the role of the grant 
size in terms of the effects. Previous research by Görg and Strobl (2007) shows that the 
effects of grants on R&D input vary by the size of the grant. More precisely, the effects 
decrease by grant size. This relationship is analyzed for the DPF grants in Germany. In 
addition, the effects on R&D output are examined to verify whether the public money is 
translated successfully into new products.  
The empirical analysis is based on an annual innovation survey, the German part of the 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS). This data is merged with a database comprising of 
information on subsidized projects in order to identify a firm’s subsidy status for each year. 
The sample consists of over 8,000 firm-year observations covering the manufacturing and 
knowledge-intensive service sectors in the time period from 1994 to 2005. A non-parametric 
matching approach with multiple treatments is employed in order to provide insights into the 
impact of R&D grants on R&D input, viz. private R&D expenditures and on R&D output viz. 
sales with products new to the market. Thereby, I distinguish the effect with respect to firm’s 
DPF history and DPF grant size.  
The contribution of this study to the literature lies firstly in the allowance to a certain extent 
for heterogeneous effects of the subsidies. There is no study to date which links the effects of 
subsidies to firm’s subsidy history by differentiating the effects between firms who receive an 
R&D grant for the first time or rather continuously. Another distinctive feature is that I 
condition the effects on the grant size – which has only been conducted in detail for Ireland. 
Finally, I extend the literature by examining the effects on R&D output. 
3 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section the relevant literature is reviewed. 
Section 3 sketches the analyzed public funding scheme and derives the hypotheses. 
Subsequently the data set as well as the econometric approach underlying the empirical 
analysis is explained. The estimation results are presented in section 5, before drawing 
conclusions in the last section. 
2 Literature Review  
A large number of studies have been conducted over the last decades which try to answer the 
question of whether public R&D subsidies and company-financed R&D are substitutes or 
complements. Klette et al. (2000) and David et al. (2000) criticize, in their surveys, the 
underlying assumption of the random allocation of subsidies to firms in most analyses. This is 
indeed a challenging assumption since not all eligible firms might be aware of and acquainted 
with public support programs and therefore not all eligible firms apply for subsidies (self-
selection). In addition, government authorities who decide on the applications may follow a 
picking-the-winner strategy in order to increase the probability of success and thus favor more 
capable or R&D-experienced firms. This leads to a selection bias which needs to be taken into 
account in order to analyze the question appropriately. Various studies have emerged since 
then which correct for the potential bias within the analysis of the effects of public R&D 
subsidies on firms’ R&D activities.  
With regard to studies for other countries or regions the results are somewhat ambiguous but 
tend to reject the full crowding-out hypothesis for R&D inputs.1 Concerning empirical 
analyses for Germany all the studies agree on the rejection of the full crowding-out 
hypothesis. These include the analyses by Czarnitzki et al. (2007) and Aerts and Schmidt 
(2008) which are part of country comparisons with Finland and Flanders respectively, as well 
as studies on subsets of firms like studies by Czarnitzki (2001), Fier (2002), Almus and 
Czarnitzki (2003), Licht and Stadler (2003), Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004), and Hussinger 
(2008) for the manufacturing sector, Czarnitzki and Fier (2002) for the service sector, 
Czarnitzki (2001), Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) and Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) for Eastern 
Germany. 
The majority of the studies look at the overall receipt of a subsidy, irrespective of whether it is 
from the regional, federal or EU government and ignoring the size of the subsidy. Studies by 
Fier (2002), Licht and Stadler (2003), Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004) and Hussinger (2008) 
focus on the DPF scheme and take the amount of the grant into account in order to be able to 
                                                 
1 Full crowding-out effects are rejected in studies Aerts and Czarnitzki (2004, 2006), Aerts and Schmidt (2008) 
for Flanders, Duguet (2004) for France, González et al. (2005), González and Pazó (2008), Herrera and Heijs 
(2007) for Spain, Görg and Strobl (2007) for Ireland, Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005) for Finland, Lööf and 
Heshmati (2007) for Sweden, Streicher et al. (2004) for Austria. Partial crowding-out effects cannot not be 
rejected by Busom (2000) for 30% of firms (even full crowding-out effects are not ruled out), Herrera and Heijs 
(2007) for Spain, Kaiser (2006) for Denmark, Lach (2002) for Israel, Suetens (2002) for Flanders, Wallsten 
(2000) for USA while it is rejected by Aerts and Czarnitzki (2006) for Flanders and González and Pazó (2008) 
for Spain. For a review of recent studies see also Aerts et al. (2007). 
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distinguish between full and partial crowding-out and additionality effects. All the studies are 
based on the same data set: a sample of firms in the manufacturing sector covering the period 
1992 to 2000 (1992-1998 in Fier, 2002). The cross-sections are pooled for the analysis. Fier 
(2002), Licht and Stadler (2003) and Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004) apply a matching 
approach to investigate the effects of DPF grants on firm’s R&D expenditures and/or R&D 
intensities. Hussinger (2008) employs parametric and semi-parametric selection models. In 
the four studies both full and partial crowding-out effects are rejected and they agree on the 
stimulation of firm’s private R&D by DPF grants. 
Most existing studies focus on the average effect of the subsidies for the firms. But some 
studies suggest that the effects might vary considerably. Busom (2000) points in her study to 
the variation of the effects – for the majority of the participants public funding induces private 
efforts, but for 30 percent of them full crowding-out effects cannot be ruled out – , but does 
not provide suggestions for the source of heterogeneity. A few analyses have taken a more 
detailed look at the effects and find heterogeneous effects depending on the type of recipient 
and subsidy characteristics.  
González et al. (2005), González and Pazó (2008) and Lach (2002) find evidence that the 
subsidy effect varies by firm size. For Israeli manufacturing firms, Lach (2000) finds positive 
treatment effects on company-financed R&D expenditure for small firms (up to 100 
employees) but no significant effects for large firms. For Spanish manufacturing firms, 
González and Pazó (2008) examine the effect of R&D subsidies on subsidized firms, 
depending on firms’ size and the technological level of the sectors in which the firms operate. 
Their results suggest the absence of both complete and partial crowding-out effects between 
public and private R&D spending for any subsample of firms. But also no stimulation effect is 
found if the control group consists of only R&D performing firms. Allowing all firms as 
potential control firms they find a significantly positive effect on private R&D efforts which 
can be attributed to the group of small firms (up to 200 employees) and firms operating in the 
low technology sector. They explain this with the effect of subsidies on the induction to 
perform R&D activities for these firms. Both studies agree that, in particular, small firms tend 
to be stimulated by grants. 
Empirical results which hint at a variation of effects by the subsidy size are found by Görg 
and Strobl (2007). They differentiate the effects on Irish manufacturing firms by the size of 
the subsidy. For this purpose they divide the firms into tertiles depending on the absolute 
volume of subsidies they receive. Estimating the effects of the subsidies for each group 
separately they show that small grants have an additionality effect for domestic firms whereas 
large grants crowd out firms’ own R&D expenditures. For foreign firms neither additionality 
nor crowding-out effects are revealed for any subgroup. 
The differentiation of effects which has been done so far for Germany involves firms’ 
location and grant size. Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) find stimulating effects of public R&D 
subsidies on R&D and innovation expenditures for firms located in Eastern and Western 
Germany. However, the degree of additionality is larger for firms in the Eastern part. Fier 
(2002) differentiates the effects of DPF grants on firms’ total R&D expenditure – including 
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the volume of the DPF grant – among four classes of grant size and finds larger effects for 
larger grants. But this could also be solely due to the grant size. No further elaboration has 
been conducted on this issue. 
In some studies the results of the direct effects on R&D input are used to investigate their 
further effect on the R&D output. Empirical evidence on this indirect impact is still limited. 
The indirect effects of R&D subsidies on patents as an R&D output measure are analyzed by 
Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004), Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) and Aerts (2008). Hussinger 
(2008) and Aerts (2008) look at the effects on new products. Except for the study by Aerts 
(2008), the R&D outcome in the other studies is measured contemporaneous to the conducted 
R&D and the receipt of the funding. Overall the studies conducted for Germany agree on 
private and publicly induced R&D being equally effective in producing the different R&D 
outcomes.  
In this paper I want to shed more light on the heterogeneity of the effects of subsidies. In 
doing so, I examine the role of firms’ subsidy history for the relationship between public and 
private R&D expenditures, an aspect which has not yet been really explored. Hussinger 
(2008) has, however, addressed this issue and left it as an open question. Secondly, I elaborate 
further on the link between grant size and its impact on the effect. In addition, the effects of 
the subsidies on subsequent R&D output are examined, also depending on DPF history and 
size.  
3 Contextual Framework  
3.1 The Direct R&D Project Funding (DPF) Scheme 
The focus in this paper is set on a specific public support scheme, the German Federal 
Government’s non-defense DPF. This is the most important tool used by the German Federal 
government to fund R&D in private businesses.2 In 2005, firms received a total of 745 million 
euros under this scheme (BMBF, 2006a).3 Since then the importance of this funding scheme 
in Germany has increased and will increase further since it is the main distribution channel for 
the new ‘High-Tech Strategy’ launched by the Federal Government (BMBF, 2006b).  
The DPF scheme offers grant aid funding for R&D projects in predefined fields of 
technology, for example, biotechnology, sustainable development, information technology 
and materials research, but also covers production technologies, transport, health, energy, 
optical, aerospace technology, space and many more. The fields of technology are selected by 
the government and the financial support is thematically restricted to R&D projects targeting 
the respective field of technology. Within each technology field thematic programs are 
                                                 
2 Tax-based R&D incentives are not available in Germany. 
3 448.5 million euros were given by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 296.1 million euros by the 
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology. 
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defined which include funding objectives and eligibility criteria. Programs run for several 
years and are made public through calls. The application for R&D projects to be funded has to 
be made within fixed dates. Companies and research institutions – or both together in a 
collaborative project – can submit project-based applications for funding. Program agencies 
authorized by the government and responsible for specific thematic areas decide on the 
application. The funding is granted on a cost-sharing basis. Up to 50 percent of the R&D 
project costs are covered by the government. On an average a project lasts for three years and 
the grants are paid in pre-defined yearly installments.  
3.2 Firm’s subsidy history  
Prior analysis of the DPF scheme reveals that the subsidization of firms via the DPF 
instrument shows a certain amount of continuity (Aschhoff, 2008). This can be due to 
different reasons. On the application side, firms who participate continuously in the scheme 
might have information advantages and know the support opportunities better than non-
participating firms and thus apply more often. These firms might also realize learning effects 
by using their experience for submitting further successful applications. Thus, because the 
costs for applications are lower for these firms they apply more often and their applications 
are better since they know which projects are best-suited and how to set up a successful 
application. Consequently on the approval side, their proposals might be selected more often, 
although the necessity of financial support is the same or even lower for these projects.4 
Another theory is that the government authority wants to maximize the success rate of the 
subsidized projects and follows a picking-the-winner strategy, i.e. projects of firms who show 
high R&D capabilities are selected. But promising projects could also find other external 
investors so that a substitution effect is more likely. The stable pattern could also be a result 
of the fact that the government complies with attempts of specific interest groups to privilege 
certain firms (Fier and Harhoff, 2002). In this situation the R&D stimulation effects intended 
by the DPF might not be achieved. Furthermore, the regular receipt of DPF grants might also 
change the behavior of the awardees. Firms who have received DPF grants for a longer period 
have experienced the benefits and might view DPF grants as a source of cheap money. Due to 
their experience with the grants they are acquainted with the inherent procedure and know 
what is expected from them. They might already expect getting the money again and include 
it in their R&D planning. This reasoning suggests that the risk of a crowding-out effect, i.e. 
firms (partially) substituting public R&D spending for private R&D spending, might be 
particularly pronounced for these firms. 
The relatively continuous participation of the same firms can also be a ‘natural’ result of the 
search by the government to pick those projects which the firms would not have conducted 
without the grant. If some of these ‘needy’ projects are submitted by the same firms over time 
it does not lead to a failure of the scheme.  
                                                 
4 The criteria for approving a project do not differ between firms that have already participated in the DPF 
scheme and firms who want to participate for the first time. In contrast, for example, within the SBIR program 
additional criteria apply to the evaluation of SBIR applications of firms who had received awards in the past. 
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I cannot directly identify the predominant reasons why the support scheme is rather stable in 
Germany in terms of its recipients. However, the aim of the paper is to evaluate whether the 
continuous support of (some) firms can be justified by the realized effects in terms of R&D 
input and innovation output. In order to investigate this issue I distinguish between firms with 
different subsidy histories in the analysis of the effects. I examine the effects of DPF grants on 
R&D inputs for continuously supported firms, i.e. whether DPF grants have a stimulating or 
crowding-out effect on these firms. In addition, I compare the effects with those of first-time 
participants as a benchmark case. First-time applicants cannot calculate with the approval of 
the application and thus, with the DPF grant. They may not be familiar enough with the 
procedure of the DPF system. Therefore, if there is a change of behavior due to continuous 
support, the effects should be different for these two groups of firms. 
3.3 Grant size 
The grant size might be another characteristic which has an impact on the effect of the public 
support. In particular for large projects the conducting firms might not be able or willing to 
bear the risk alone and to finance the project with only their own financial means – even in 
the presence of a positive net present value – or get the project externally financed (GIB, 
2004). Thus, the conduct of the project might be dependent on the provision of public money. 
Based on this argument a stimulation effect is more likely for large projects than for small 
ones. Vice versa, small projects have a higher tendency to lead to a crowding-out effect than 
larger projects. 
Another situation in which crowding-out effects can take place is when firm’s R&D capacity 
cannot be extended at will in the short-run even if the firm gets public support for a project, 
i.e. R&D activities are inelastic to a certain degree. For instance, R&D capabilities of a firm 
might be restricted in terms of R&D personnel. A firm might not find enough adequate R&D 
personnel necessary for a large project or it might hesitate to extensively increase the overall 
R&D personnel in order to avoid long-term employment commitments. Thus a large project 
might not be conducted additionally; it is more likely that the R&D expenditures will be 
reallocated from another project to the subsidized project which results in the other project not 
being undertaken. Thus, the probability of crowding-out effects increases with grant size. This 
reasoning contradicts the former derived relation between grant size and effects.  
The direction of the impact of the grant size is a priori not clear. Görg and Strobl (2007) find 
evidence that effectiveness differs by grant size. They found for domestic firms in Ireland that 
the stimulating effect turns negative for large grants. With regard to foreign-owned companies 
the effect does not vary by grant size.  
Positive effects on R&D input do not necessarily lead to new technologies. If the conduct of 
the project is only feasible due to the subsidies, the project probably has a low level of private 
returns or is associated with a high level of risk. In addition, the publicly induced R&D might 
not be spent very efficiently, for example, due to the higher demand for R&D personnel their 
wages increase as found by Goolsbee (1998) or Wolff and Reinthaler (2008). Therefore, the 
effects of DPF grants are also investigated in terms of R&D output depending on the different 
subgroups. 
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3.4 Taxonomy of possible effects on firm’s R&D expenditures 
Subsidies for R&D can have varying effects on a firm’s R&D expenditure. The possible 
effects with the corresponding terminology used in the literature are sketched in this 
subsection. Beginning with the most negative effect, it is possible that the firm completely 
substitutes company-financed R&D by subsidies, i.e. the subsidy crowds out privately 
financed R&D Euro by Euro. In case of full crowding-out, a firm’s total R&D expenditures 
are the same with and without subsidies. Partial crowding-out is found if privately-financed 
(total) R&D is lower (higher) in the situation of public funding than in the situation without it. 
However, the decrease is smaller than the amount of the grant. No effect of subsidies on 
firm’s own R&D financing arises if the firm’s privately-financed R&D expenditure is the 
same with and without subsidies. Public subsidies and privately-financed R&D act like 
complements. Firm’s total R&D expenditures increase by the amount of the subsidy 
compared to the scenario in which the firm does not receive a subsidy. An additional effect of 
the subsidy is achieved if the firm increases privately-financed R&D spending due to the 
receipt of the subsidy, i.e. company-financed R&D is higher in the presence of a subsidy than 
if the firm does not receive a subsidy. The four possible types of effects are depicted in Figure 
1. 
Figure 1: Concept of possible effects of a DPF grant on firm’s R&D expenditure 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
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4 Empirical Specification 
The methodological approach chosen to examine the change in firm’s R&D input and output 
arising from DPF grants is outlined in the next subsection. In the subsequent subsections I 
describe the data set and variables used for the analysis. 
4.1 Estimation strategy 
4.1.1 Effect of DPF grants on R&D input 
In the empirical analysis it needs to be taken into account that the receipt of a subsidy does 
not happen by chance but is rather subject to different selection processes, both on the firm’s 
and the government’s side. In the case of firms with per se higher R&D dynamics or a more 
efficient innovation management that transfers R&D results more successfully into 
innovations who show a higher propensity to receive funding, effects of public funding on 
R&D input and output need to be controlled for this selection bias. Several econometric 
methods have been developed in order to get reliable results on program effects even in the 
presence of selection bias. Such econometric techniques include instrumental variable (IV) 
regression, difference-in-difference analysis and matching methods.5 The latter approach was 
established and first used in the evaluation of labor market economics (see, for example, 
Angrist 1998, Heckman et al. 1997, 1998a, 1998b, Lechner 1999, 2000) and has been later 
transferred to the evaluation of public R&D funding. The matching approach has been 
extended by Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) from the context of a binary treatment to the 
case of multiple treatments. It has been widely used in recent years as an estimation 
technique6 and is also applied in this study.  
In the first step the effect of DPF grants on firm’s R&D expenditures is investigated. Since I 
am interested in the role of DPF history and DPF size, I define a discrete number of 
subgroups of DPF recipients according to these two dimensions and consider them as multiple 
treatments. Görg and Strobl (2007) chose the same approach in their study on grant size. In 
total there are M+1 mutually exclusive states or treatments due to M different categories plus 
the case in which the firm does not receive a DPF grant. Participation in a specific category is 
indicated by the variable {0,1,..., }S M∈ . The R&D measures are the so-called outcome 
variables and the value is denoted by {Y0, Y1,…, YM}. For each firm only the realization of the 
outcome variable in state S=m is observable. The remaining M outcomes are not observed for 
the firm. The aim is the pairwise comparison of the effects of treatments m and l on the firms 
in state m, for example, comparing the outcome between first-time subsidized firms (S=m) 
                                                 
5 For an overview and discussion of the econometric approaches see Heckman et al. (1999), Blundell and Costa 
Dias (2000) or Aerts et al. (2007). The latter survey concentrates on the evaluation of public R&D subsidies. 
6 Aerts and Czarnitzki (2004), Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), Czarnitzki (2001), Czarnitzki et al. (2007), 
Czarnitzki and Fier (2002), Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004), Czarnitzki and Licht (2006), Fier (2002), Gonzáles 
and Pazó (2008), Herrera and Heijs (2007), Licht and Stadler (2003), Lööf and Heshmati (2007) apply nearest 
neighbor matching; Duguet (2004), Licht and Stadler (2003) kernel matching; Aerts and Schmidt (2008), Görg 
and Strobl (2007) a combination of matching and difference-in-difference. Czarnitzki et al. (2007) and Görg and 
Strolb (2007) consider multiple treatments in their studies. 
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and not subsidized firms (S=l) conditional on the first-time receipt m. The average treatment 
effect on the treated αm,l can be expressed as 
( ) ( ), | |m l m lE Y S m E Y S mα = = − = .      (0.1) 
Since mY  is observed, ( | )mE Y S m=  can be measured directly by the sample mean of the 
outcome for the group of firms with S=m. The situation ( | )lE Y S m=  is called the 
counterfactual situation since it is not observable by design and has to be estimated. In the 
presence of a selection bias an estimation of the counterfactual outcome via the sample mean 
of the outcome for the group of firms with S=l leads to biased results. 
The basic idea of matching is to balance the sample of firms receiving m and firms in state l 
by selecting the best twin (in terms of exogenous characteristics that determine the state m) 
from the control group for each firm in state m. Then the means of the outcome can be 
compared between the two groups. The advantage of the matching method is – since it is a 
non-parametric method – that a functional form for the outcome equation is not necessary. 
The disadvantage is the need for strong assumptions. In order to identify the average 
treatment effect three assumptions have to hold: the conditional independence assumption 
(CIA), the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) and the common support. The 
CIA was introduced by Rubin (1977) and states that for firms with the same set of exogenous 
characteristics X x= , the treatment and outcome variables are independent: 
0 1, ,..., |MY Y Y S X x⊥ = .        (0.2) 
The CIA implies that all characteristics which influence both treatment and potential outcome 
have to be observed. It cannot be tested whether the CIA is fulfilled or not. Given the broad 
range of variables in our data set it is reasonable that I have enough information on the firms 
to sufficiently approximate the treatment and the outcome so that the CIA holds. This is 
supported by the fact that comparable data sets have been used in the past for several 
matching studies (see footnote 6). If the CIA holds, the outcome of the treated group – firms 
in state m – in the counterfactual situation can be approximated by the outcome of a control 
group of firms in state l which strongly resembles (i.e. match) the treatment group: 
( ) { }
( ), ( )
| | ( ), ( ), |
m l
l l m l
P X P X
E Y S m E E Y P X P X S l S m⎡ ⎤= = = =⎣ ⎦ .   (0.3) 
In addition, the SUTVA demands that the treatment of a particular firm must not influence the 
outcome of other firms (Rubin, 1990). The validity of SUTVA cannot be tested empirically 
either. A further requirement is the common support which requires that firms with the same 
characteristics have a positive probability of participating in all states. This condition assures 
that for each treated observation a similar control can be found. In order to secure common 
support, observations with probabilities larger than the smallest maximum and smaller than 
the largest minimum of all subsamples defined by S are deleted.  
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If all assumptions hold the average treatment effect of the treated firms can be estimated as 
( ) { },
( ), ( )
| | ( ), ( ), |
m l
m l m l m l
P X P X
E Y S m E E Y P X P X S l S mα ⎡ ⎤= = − = =⎣ ⎦ .  (0.4) 
Differences in the means of the outcome variable between firms receiving treatment m and the 
selected control group consisting of firms in state l are then attributed to the treatment m, i.e. 
to the first-time receipt of a DPF grant in the example above (Heckman et al. 1997). 
In the ideal case, the best twin for a firm in state m is the firm which is identical in all relevant 
characteristics X. But if the number of matching criteria is large it would hardly be possible to 
find any such observations. Therefore, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) developed propensity 
score matching. The idea is to estimate the propensity score which is the probability of being 
treated with m and to find pairs for each firm receiving m in the group of firms in state l that 
have the same probability value of treatment m. Usually one does not perform an exact 
matching but the popular ‘nearest neighbor’ matching which is also applied in this study, i.e. 
one selects the control observation with the estimated probability value closest to the treated 
firm. Using this propensity score one reduces the multidimensional problem of several 
matching criteria to one single measure of distance. Lechner (1998) introduced a modification 
of the propensity score matching, as one often wants to insert additional variables, for 
example, firm size, into the matching function. In this case instead of a single Z (propensity 
score) other important characteristics of the firms may also be employed in Z. 
The selection of the control firm is based on the Mahalanobis metric. In order to identify the 
firm in state l which is the closest neighbor to the treated firm in state m, the distance to 
minimize is 
( ) ( )' 1ml m l m lMD z z z z−= − Ω −        (0.5) 
with 1−Ω  being the sample covariance matrix of the comparison group. 
In order to examine the effect in terms of firm’s DPF history, I consider three treatments: no 
DPF, first-time DPF and frequent DPF. The analysis with respect to DPF size is based on four 
treatments: no DPF, small DPF, medium DPF, and large DPF. The corresponding propensity 
scores are estimated on the basis of a multinomial probit model including several firm 
characteristics – which are explained in the subsection on the variables – to explain the 
treatments. In addition to the propensity score, I include the firm size (no. of employees in 
logarithm), and the knowledge within the firm (patent stock) in the calculation of the 
Mahalanobis distance since both these quantitative information are of particular importance 
for the explanation of receiving a DPF grant and R&D spending. Besides the receipt of other 
subsidies (from EU and from regional government) and the year need to be exact matches to 
avoid biases as far as possible due to other funding sources and changes in macroeconomic 
conditions over time. The matching protocol follows the one by Gerfin and Lechner (2002) 
which is also applied by Czarnitzki et al. (2007) and is depicted in Table 8 in the appendix.  
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4.1.2 Effect of DPF grants on R&D output 
In order to analyze the effect of the subsidies on R&D output I apply the approach suggested 
by Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004). Based on matching results, R&D expenditures of 
subsidized firms are disentangled into two components: R&D expenditures which would have 
been spent anyway (R&D_C), i.e., also without the subsidy, and the publicly induced R&D 
which encompasses the amount of R&D grant and the additionally invested amount 
(R&D_Dif). For not subsidized firms the former R&D part equals the observed R&D 
expenditures, the latter R&D measure is zero by construction. In order to relate these two 
measures of R&D input to output, ‘productivity functions’ are estimated. Firms’ innovation 
output is measured in terms of sales with market novelties and the corresponding share of 
sales. In addition to the R&D input measures, I control for firm’s sales to proxy firm’s access 
to the market, previous successful R&D with means of the lagged patent stock, whether the 
firm cooperates with other firms or institutions in its innovation activities and whether the 
firm is located in Eastern Germany. In addition, industry and year dummy variables are 
included in order to take industry differences and macroeconomic variation into account. The 
control variables are included in vector Vi,t. Thus, the estimated equation has the following 
form: 
, , , , ( 1)(R&D_C , R&D_Dif , ),i t j i t i t i t tOutput f V+ −=      (0.6) 
with j=1,2. To investigate the effect on the level of sales with market novelties, I take the 
logarithms of the variable. Zero values are set to the minimum value. Since the level of 
innovative sales is left-censored and the intensity left- and right-censored (at 0 and 100 
respectively) I apply censored regression models for these models. 
4.2 Data Set  
The empirical analysis is based on the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), an annual 
innovation survey conducted by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) on 
behalf of the BMBF since 1993.7 The MIP is the German part of the European-wide 
harmonized Community Innovation Survey (CIS). The data contains information on firm’s 
R&D and innovation activities and a wide range of firm characteristics like number of 
employees, sales and industry among other things. I use the surveys conducted between 1995 
and 2006 covering the time period 1994 to 2005. Since participation in the survey is not 
mandatory half of the firms are only observed once. Thus, the different cross sections are 
pooled for the empirical part. The survey data is supplemented with information on the DPF 
grants which is extracted from the R&D project database of the German Federal Government. 
The project-level data on the grants is aggregated to the firm level and is used to identify the 
years in which a firm received a grant within the DPF scheme. In addition, patent application 
data from the European Patent Office is merged.  
                                                 
7 For a detailed description of this database see Rammer et al. (2005). 
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Since the DPF scheme does not aim at motivating firms to start R&D activities – this has also 
been shown empirically (cf. Aschhoff, 2008) – the sample of firms is limited to R&D-
performing firms, i.e. firms with positive R&D expenditures. This restriction ensures that the 
potential control group – firms without DPF grants – is more similar to firms with DPF grants 
and avoids an overestimation of the effect. The final data set contains 8,528 firm-year 
observations from 3,583 different firms from manufacturing and knowledge-intensive service 
sectors.  
4.3 Variables  
4.3.1 Endogenous variables  
In this study I empirically analyze the effects of DPF grants on firm’s R&D activities in 
Germany. In total I have three endogenous variables: the treatments, i.e. the receipt of DPF 
grants, firm’s R&D expenditure as outcome variable in the matching and sales with products 
new to the market as a measure for R&D output.  
Since it is assumed that the DPF grants are not allocated randomly we treat the receipt of a 
DPF grant as endogenous. Almost 13 percent of the firms in the sample receive DPF grants 
amounting to 146,000 euros on average.8 I want to allow, to a certain extent, for 
heterogeneous treatment effects for firm’s DPF history and DPF size. Therefore I split the 
sample of DPF recipients into several subsamples. In terms of firm’s DPF history I am 
particularly interested in the effects due to frequent support. Therefore, one subgroup contains 
firms who continuously received DPF grants over a 5 year period (frequent DPF).9 A second 
group which serves as a benchmark group for the effects consists of firms who receive DPF 
grants for the first time in the current or preceding year within the last 5-year-period. Thus, 
these firms get new grants and they do not have (recent) experience with the scheme. The rest 
of the funded firms, i.e. firms who receive DPF grants occasionally, are not considered in this 
part of the analysis. 
Alternatively I divide the firms who receive DPF grants into three subgroups depending on 
the amount of the DPF grant(s) based on tertiles of the subsidy size. Small grants are below 
37,200 euros, large ones larger than 99,000 euros. Since the data set includes observations 
from a 12-year-period all monetary variables have been deflated.10 
My interest lies in the effects of the subsidies on firms’ R&D expenditure. In order to test the 
full and partial crowding-out hypothesis I use the following outcome variables: (i) total R&D 
expenditures11 (in million euros), and (ii) private R&D expenditure which includes only 
                                                 
8 In 2000 and from 2002 onwards, firms with DPF grants are deliberately overrepresented in the sample. Without 
these additional firms the share of firms receiving DPF is 10%. Results are robust to the drop of these firms. 
9 The grant is not necessarily newly awarded. A grant in a certain year can also refer to an ongoing subsidized 
project. 
10 The industry-specific deflator is developed by Peters et al. (2009) and takes into account the composition of 
R&D expenditures in terms of investments, personnel and material expenditures. The deflator consists of the 
respective indices, weighted by their shares in the industry.  
11 Defined in accordance with the Frascati Manual (OECD, 1993) 
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privately financed R&D expenditures, i.e. total R&D minus the amount of DPF grants. 
Private R&D expenditures may also include subsidies awarded under other schemes or by 
other authorities. Since I do not have information on the amount of this support, I cannot 
adjust the private R&D spending. However, in the matching approach I control for other 
support measures by ensuring that this subsidy status is identical for firms with DPF and their 
matched counterparts. As a robustness check the corresponding intensities defined as the 
R&D variables divided by sales (multiplied by 100) are also considered. In Table 1 R&D 
spending for the different treatment groups are presented. Due to the skewed distribution, the 
R&D variables are included as logarithms in the analysis.  
Table 1: Mean values of R&D expenditures  
  Total R&D° Private R&D° Total R&D/sales+ Private R&D/sales+ No. of obs. 
whole sample 1.660 1.641 6.645 6.327 8,528 
no DPF 1.211 1.211 5.738 5.738 7,405 
with DPF 4.618 4.472 12.624 10.211 1,123 
with DPF      
DPF history      
   first 2.603 2.508 12.154 9.612 333 
   frequent 6.341 6.131 13.406 11.102 370 
DPF size      
   small 2.429 2.411 8.728 7.731 374 
   medium 3.323 3.260 12.908 10.365 374 
   large 8.091 7.737 16.225 12.529 375 
Note: ° in million euros, deflated. + in percent. Sample is restricted to firms with positive R&D expenditures. 
Firms who receive DPF grants show higher R&D expenditures than non-funded firms, both in 
terms of absolute values and intensities. The same picture emerges when subtracting the 
volume of the grant from the overall R&D expenditure. Firms receiving DPF grants spend, on 
average, almost four times more on R&D than R&D performing firms without DPF grants. 
Relating the expenditures to firm’s sales, the difference is not as large but still significant. 
When firms are distinguished by their DPF history, it becomes apparent that frequent DPF 
recipients have higher R&D spending than first-time recipients. However, R&D intensities are 
not significantly different. The higher absolute values of the frequent recipients are due to the 
fact that this group consists of larger firms in terms of their sales. The descriptive comparison 
gives no indication that the effect on R&D depends on DPF history, once it is controlled for 
firm size. Firm’s private R&D spending increases with the amount of the R&D grant. Firms 
receiving a large DPF grant – the median amount is 200,000 Euro – spend significantly more 
on R&D with their own financial means than firms who receive smaller DPF grants. In terms 
of R&D intensities firms with middle- and large-sized grants have a higher intensity than 
small grant recipients. This indicates that the effect of DPF funding might increase with grant 
size.  
Firms’ R&D output is measured by the sales with market novelties (logarithm values are 
taken in the estimations) and the corresponding share in total sales. These variables not only 
capture the generation of new products but also their market success. Since the development 
of new products takes time the variables refer to subsequent periods with respect to the R&D 
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investments. This information is taken from subsequent survey years. Since not all firms 
participate in the survey each year, I can only use a little less than half of the observations for 
this analysis. About 48 percent of the firms don’t have any sales with market novelties. Less 
than 1 percent of the firms realize 100 percent of the sales with new products to the market. 
The summary statistics of the output are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: Summary statistics of R&D output  
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max No. of obs. 
Sales with market novelties °      
   t+1 2.570 7.501 0 71.102 3,951 
   t+2 2.464 7.253 0 71.849 3,544 
Share of sales with market novelties +      
   t+1 8.217 15.550 0 100 3,951 
   t+2 7.738 14.467 0 100 3,544 
Note: ° in million euros, deflated. + in percent.  
4.3.2 Explanatory variables 
The explanatory variables include variables which may influence the probability of receiving 
a DPF grant and R&D expenditure. The variables are similar to those found important in 
previous empirical studies. First of all I control by means of dummy variables for the receipt 
of subsidies from European schemes within the preceding three-year-period t-2 to t (Sub_EU) 
and the receipt of subsidies from the regional level within this period (Sub_regional). Firms 
who participate in other funding programs probably know the subsidy system with its funding 
opportunities quite well and have expertise in applying for and getting public grants. 
Therefore they are also more likely to receive a DPF grant. Dropping all firms receiving 
subsidies from other sources leads to a reduction of the DPF recipients by 50 percent and may 
cause a severe bias in the sample of DPF recipients. Instead within the matching procedure 
the statuses of the two other funding sources are included in the matching function as an exact 
matching condition, i.e. they are identical for treated and selected control firms. As a 
robustness check the analysis will be repeated only with treated firms who receive no other 
subsidies. 
Firm size is expected to be an important variable in explaining the receipt of DPF grants and 
the R&D activities (e.g., Hussinger 2008, Griffith et al., 2006). R&D projects conducted by 
SMEs can receive grants up to 60 percent of the project costs (instead of 50 percent). Firm 
size is measured as the number of employees and taken as a logarithm to avoid estimation 
biases caused by its skewed distribution. In addition, firm’s age is controlled for also as a 
logarithm. 
I use three variables to control for firm’s R&D capabilities. R&D capable firms are both more 
likely to get DPF grants and probably spend more on R&D. The sample is restricted to firms 
with positive R&D expenditures but that does not exhibit information on whether a firm 
conducts R&D on a continuous basis. Therefore, a corresponding dummy variable is 
generated: R&D_con. Conducting R&D continuously is often associated with having a 
separate R&D department and separate R&D controlling which can ease to comply with 
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accounting and project documentation requirements of the DPF scheme. A second measure 
for firms’ capabilities to generate and acquire knowledge is related to the human capital. I 
proxy a firm’s human capital intensity by the percentage of employees with a university 
degree (Qualification). Previous (successful) R&D activities are approximated by the firm’s 
patent stock. This variable is generated by depreciating the sum of all patent applications 
which were filed at the European Patent Office since 1979 until t-1. The depreciation rate is 
constant and equals 0.15 which is common in the literature (e.g. Griliches and Mairesse, 
1984; Hall, 1990). Due to variations in the patent propensity between industries, the patent 
stock is rescaled by the average patent stock on the three-digit-level (Patent_stock_dev). To 
ensure that the patents refer to previous R&D activities the variable considers only patent 
applications till t-1. 
Firms who are part of a national or foreign enterprise group will have access to a broader 
knowledge pool and might benefit from knowledge transfers within the group. Besides SMEs 
which belong to a group with a large parent company are not eligible anymore for DPF 
subprograms designed for SMEs. The DPF scheme might also be oriented in particular 
towards domestic firms since the government wants to generate economic effects located in 
Germany out of DPF funding. With respect to R&D activities, foreign firms may pool their 
activities in the parent’s home country. Two dummy variables are included in the analysis 
indicating the membership in a national or foreign group (Group_national, Group_foreign). 
Firms located in the Eastern part are still lagging behind firms from the Western part in terms 
of R&D and productivity (Czarnitzki, 2005; Aschhoff et al., 2008). I generate a dummy 
variable for firms located in Eastern Germany (East). Finally, sector and year dummy 
variables are included to control for further differences between industries and over time in 
the economy respectively. Summary statistics of all explanatory variables are provided in 
Table 9 in the appendix.  
5 Empirical Results 
5.1 Effect of DPF grants on R&D input 
5.1.1 Input effects of DPF receipt 
In the first step I examine the effect of DPF grants on R&D input. First, the effect of receiving 
a DPF grant in general is analyzed. A probit model on the probability of receiving a DPF 
grant is estimated (see Table 10 in the appendix). The results give evidence for the presence 
of a selection into the DPF scheme. In particular the participation in other funding schemes 
helps to get DPF grants. Additionally large firms with a strong R&D record are more likely to 
participate in the scheme since the probability increases with R&D capabilities, past patenting 
and firm size. This can be because of company decisions (i.e. applying more often or being 
more capable to submit high-quality proposals) or a picking-the-winner strategy by the 
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government. Furthermore, the government sets a focus on high technology manufacturing 
firms. Since special R&D support programs for firms located in Eastern Germany are partly 
not integrated in the DPF scheme, East German firms do not receive DPF grants significantly 
more often. The results are in line with previous findings (e.g. Fier, 2002; Hussinger, 2008). 
In the next step a “twin” firm is selected for each firm that has received a DPF grant (“treated 
firm”). The matching procedure is successful in balancing out the differences for the 
exogenous variables between the treated and the selected control group since t-tests on the 
mean difference of these variables do not show significant differences after matching.12 Hence 
the remaining differences in the outcome variables, after the matching procedures between the 
treated and the non-treated firm, can be interpreted as the average treatment effect on the 
treated firms (α). Table 3 illustrates the values for the outcome variables, i.e. firm’s R&D 
efforts for both groups and the corresponding differences. Looking at the total R&D 
expenditures and the R&D intensity, the average treatment effect is significant and positive, 
i.e. DPF firms spend more on R&D and show a higher R&D intensity than the group of 
matched control firms. Thus the full crowding-out hypothesis can be rejected. By looking at 
the private R&D efforts only – i.e. subtracting the DPF grant from total R&D – the effect is 
still positive and significant. Private R&D expenditures of firms with DPF grants are higher 
both in absolute and relative terms than that of firms without the grant. Thus, the DPF scheme 
stimulates additional private R&D spending.  
The results confirm previous studies focusing on the DPF scheme which also find 
additionality effects for the period until 2000 (Fier, 2002; Licht and Stadler, 2003; Hussinger, 
2008). It seems that in recent years this effect has not changed.  
Table 3: Comparison of R&D efforts after the matching for the whole sample 
 With DPF No DPF α 
ln(total R&D) 6.907 6.337 0.571 *** 
ln(total R&Dint) 1.664 1.200 0.464 *** 
  
ln(private R&D) 6.729 6.337 0.392 *** 
ln(private R&Dint) 1.486 1.200 0.286 *** 
no. ob obs. 1,108 1,108  
Note: Mean values are shown. α is the average treatment effect of DPF on the treated firms. *** (**, *) indicates 
significance level of 1% (5%, 10%) of the two-sided t-tests on mean equality between the firms with DPF and 
the selected control group. The standard errors of the t-statistics are based on the approximation by Lechner 
(2001) that accounts for sampling with replacement in the selected control group. The control variables as well 
as the propensity score are not significantly different between the treated and selected control groups after 
matching. Sub_EU, Sub_regional and year variables are exact matches. To improve the readability by avoiding 
negative mean values, the logarithm is taken from R&D expenditures measured in 1,000 euros. α and its 
significance are not affected by this rescaling.  
                                                 
12 Results of the t-tests are not reported. In order to evaluate the quality of the matching I also re-estimate the 
propensity score by using only the matched sample and taking account of replacement in the control group by 
weighting. As stated by Sianesi (2004) the pseudo-R2 after matching should be quite low because there should 
be no more systematic differences in the regressors between treated and control companies. In this setting the 
Pseudo-R2 after the re-estimation is below 0.005 and a likelihood ratio suggests that there is no joint significance 
of all covariates of the probit model after matching. 
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5.1.2 Input effects depending on DPF history 
In the next step I analyze the effect of the subsidies depending on a firm’s DPF history. For 
this purpose I generate two clear-cut subsamples of treated firms as described in section 4 – 
first-time DPF recipients and frequent recipients, both measures relate to the preceding five-
year-period. The two types of recipients are regarded as two treatments. The sample of non-
treated firms remains the same.13 Multinomial probit models are estimated to determine the 
propensities to be either type of DPF recipient (see Table 10 in the appendix). It becomes 
apparent that in particular frequent DPF recipients are successful in raising other public 
funding and more prevalent in medium-high and high technology manufacturing sectors.  
Based on the estimated propensity scores and after taking care of common support, the three 
groups – frequent DPF firms, first time DPF firms and firms without DPF are pairwise 
matched. The R&D efforts and their differences after matching are presented in Table 4. First 
I am interested in the effect for the two types of DPF recipients compared to non-recipients in 
order to conclude whether the grants have a stimulation effect on both groups. The effect on 
first-time recipients serves basically as a benchmark for the effect on the frequent ones. For 
each DPF group, total R&D is higher for supported firms than for their not supported 
counterparts, i.e. the hypothesis of full crowding-out can be rejected. In terms of private R&D 
expenditures an additionality effect is only proved for the frequent DPF recipients. For first-
time DPF participants, no effect of the subsidy on private R&D is found. Though private 
R&D spending is higher for funded firms, the difference is not significant.14 These results 
show that the DPF grants are spent in addition to private R&D so that partial crowding-out 
can be rejected as well. The results give no indication that the impact of DPF grants is lower 
on firms who frequently receive grants. In contrast, an additionality effect is found for this 
group and no significant effect is found for first-time participants. Furthermore, the group of 
frequent recipients is directly compared to the first-time participants. Since the number of 
observations is similar in both groups but the characteristics of the firms differ between the 
groups for a relatively large share of frequent participants, no comparable control firm could 
be found and was dropped.15 This comparison also indicates that the effect of DPF grants on 
R&D spending is higher for frequent recipients.  
                                                 
13 An alternative could be to calculate the effects for the two subgroups based on the results of the whole sample. 
An underlying assumption would be that the likelihood for both treatments is the same. Since the determinants 
between the two groups differ to some degree, as shown in the multinomial probit model, repeating the whole 
analysis for the two treatments provides more precise results.  
14 One may argue that the effect for the group of first-time recipients is not significant because the grants are, on 
average, much smaller than those for frequent recipients. However, since the first-time participants are also 
smaller in terms of their size and R&D expenditures, the relative contribution of a DPF grant to total R&D 
spending is comparable for both groups. The grant accounts for about 15% of the total R&D expenditures in both 
groups. 
15 Although this is typical in this kind of analysis, the results should be interpreted with some caution since a 
quarter of frequent recipients are not included in the comparison.  
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Table 4: Comparison of R&D efforts after the matching depending on firm’s DPF 
history 
 
First 
DPF 
No 
DPF αm,l
Frequent 
DPF 
No
DPF αm,l  
Frequent 
DPF
First 
DPF αm,l  
 m l m l  m l  
ln(total R&D) 6.585 6.162 0.423*** 7.318 6.654 0.664***  
ln(total R&Dint) 1.539 1.218 0.322*** 1.902 1.369 0.533***  
    
ln(private R&D) 6.406 6.162 0.244 7.145 6.654 0.491*** 7.157 6.766 0.391* 
ln(private R&Dint) 1.361 1.218 0.143 1.729 1.369 0.359*** 1.555 1.206 0.349** 
no. ob obs. 320 320  340 340  264 264  
Note: Mean values are shown. αm,l is the average treatment effect on the treated. *** (**, *) indicates 
significance level of 1% (5%, 10%) of the two-sided t-tests on mean equality between the treatment group m and 
the selected control group l. The standard errors of the t-statistics are based on the approximation by Lechner 
(2001) that accounts for sampling with replacement in the selected control group. The control variables as well 
as the propensity score are not significantly different between the treated and selected control groups after 
matching. Sub_EU, Sub_regional and year variables are exact matches. To improve the readability by avoiding 
negative mean values, the logarithm is taken from R&D expenditures measured in 1,000 Euro. αm,l and its 
significance is not affected by this rescaling. 
5.1.3 Input effects depending on DPF size 
In order to analyze the effect depending on the grant size I divide the sample of DPF firms 
into three subgroups according to the received DPF amount and repeat the analysis. The 
dependent variable of the multinomial probit has four outcomes; namely, no DPF, small DPF, 
medium DPF and large DPF. The results reveal that the determinants are rather similar for the 
three groups (see Table 10 in the appendix). Firms with higher amounts of DPF support are a 
little bit larger and the financial support from the EU is more prevalent for them than for firms 
who receive small or medium-sized amounts. For the latter group of firms public funds from 
regional authorities are more likely. Again the groups are matched pairwise after common 
support is achieved. The resulting differences in the private R&D variables are shown in 
Table 5.  
DPF grants do not displace private R&D investments in any of the three subgroups. No 
crowding-out of private R&D expenditures is found. For medium and large-sized grants a 
stimulation effect on private R&D expenditures is observed. These firms increase their private 
R&D spending due to the receipt of the grant. For firms with small grants this complementary 
effect is not significant. They spend the amount of the grant additionally on R&D but these 
grants do not induce a statistically significant supplementary amount of company-funded 
R&D expenditures. The results give evidence for the need of firms for public support to 
conduct additional R&D projects. In particular the findings support the financial constraint 
argument for larger projects. These results contradict the findings of Görg and Strobl (2007) 
who recorded an additionality effect for small grants and a crowding-out effect for large 
grants for their sample of Irish manufacturing firms. 
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Table 5: Average treatment effects on the treated depending on DPF size 
 Comparison group l 
Treatment m No DPF Small DPF Medium DPF
 Outcome variable: ln(private R&D) 
Small DPF 0.168   
Medium DPF 0.392*** 0.219  
Large DPF 0.444*** 0.776*** 0.356** 
 Outcome variable: ln(private R&Dint) 
Small DPF 0.156   
Medium DPF 0.250** 0.159  
Large DPF 0.276** 0.478*** 0.115 
 No. of matched pairs 
Small DPF 361   
Medium DPF 363 311  
Large DPF 345 286 306 
Note: Average treatment effects on the treated (αm,l) are shown. *** (**, *) indicates significance level of 1% 
(5%, 10%) of the two-sided t-tests on mean equality between the treatment group m and the selected control 
group l. The standard errors of the t-statistics are based on the approximation by Lechner (2001) that accounts 
for sampling with replacement in the selected control group. All control variables as well as the propensity score 
are not significantly different between the two groups after matching. Sub_EU, Sub_regional and year variables 
are exact matches. 
One may argue that the frequent DPF participants get the large projects and therefore the 
effect may be simply a size effect for them. But even in this case the results reject that in 
particular frequent DPF participants substitute private R&D spending by public support. 
Indeed half of the frequent participants receive large grants and about 19 percent small ones 
whereas the opposite applies to the first-time participants (46%/19% receive small/large 
grants). However, looking at large grants and calculating the effect for first-time and frequent 
recipients separately, it becomes apparent that the effect is larger for the latter group. This 
also holds if the focus is set on small grants. The other way round, concentrating on first-time 
recipients and calculating the effect for each size class, the effect for firms receiving a large 
grant is much larger than the effect of small grants. For frequent recipients the effects are 
more similar for different grant sizes. Splitting the sample into all possible combinations in 
terms of DPF history and size would lead to too few observations for each category in order 
to obtain reliable results for these subsamples. 
5.1.4 Robustness check  
Using propensity scores on the basis of multinomial probit model estimations may risk that if 
the equation for one alternative is misspecified all conditional probabilities could be 
misspecified. Thus, as a robustness check the effects are recalculated based on conditional 
probabilities which are estimated separately for each pair of subsidy category with the means 
of binary probit models (see appendix B). The effect of DPF grants on frequent recipients 
compared to first-time recipients is not that pronounced here. But overall, the results shown 
above are supported by this check.  
The results might also be biased due to effects from the receipt of subsidies from other 
sources, like regional or European institutions. However, data on the amount of these 
subsidies is not available. In the analysis it is ensured that the corresponding subsidy statuses 
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are identical between the matched pairs. Nevertheless the imposed assumptions are that these 
other subsidies have the same size and the same effect on the matched firms. To check 
whether the results are robust to these assumptions the analysis is repeated excluding those 
firms who received R&D subsidies from the EU or from regional authorities (see Appendix 
C). The significance of some effects dropped slightly in this restricted sample but the findings 
do not change qualitatively.  
5.2 Effect of DPF grants on R&D output 
In order to investigate the effects of receiving a DPF grant on a firm’s R&D output (market 
novelties) the R&D expenditures are divided into two parts based on the results of the input 
analysis. The counterfactual R&D (R&D_C) is defined as the amount which would have been 
spent on R&D without having received the grant. The R&D which is related to DPF funding 
(R&D_Dif) includes the subsidy amount and the volume of R&D that was induced by the 
DPF grant. For not publicly funded firms the counterfactual R&D equals a firm’s observed 
total R&D expenditures; the subsidy-related R&D is naturally zero. The regressions are based 
on a reduced sample since the output variables on the innovation success relate to the 
following one and two years and need to be taken from the two subsequent survey years. The 
results for the differentiation between these two types of R&D are shown in the left part of 
Table 6. Overall both types of R&D expenditures have a positive effect on R&D output, 
measured as sales with market novelties and the corresponding share in total sales. The two 
R&D variables tend to be equally productive since their coefficients are not statistically 
different. This is in line with the results found by Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004), Czarnitzki 
and Licht (2006) and Hussinger (2008) for Germany. In contrast, for Flanders the impact on 
innovative output is even higher for publicly induced R&D than for the counterfactual R&D 
(Aerts, 2008).  
In addition, R&D expenditures are separated for first-time and frequent recipients in order to 
get a more detailed view of the effectiveness for the two groups of firms. For this purpose the 
two R&D variables are interacted with dummy variables indicating the corresponding group. 
The advantage of this setup is that the coefficients of the subgroups are directly comparable 
(see the right part of the table). All three groups – no grants, first-time and frequent 
participants – seem to be able to realize the same scope of sales through their “counterfactual” 
R&D. In terms of the effect of R&D expenditure induced by the DPF grant, the impact on 
sales with market novelties is equally large for both types of participants. No statistically 
significant difference can be detected between any of the R&D variables in terms of the 
effectiveness to generate and sell new products. 
  
 Table 6: Subsidy effects on firm’s R&D output – overall and depending on DPF history  
 
Sales with market novelties 
(in € million, in ln) 
Share of sales with market novelties
(in %) 
 Sales with market novelties 
(in € million, in ln) 
Share of sales with market novelties 
(in %) 
 t+1 t+2 t+1 t+2  t+1 t+2 t+1 t+2 
Variable      
R&D_C 0.122 0.208 3.258*** 4.711***    
 (0.270) (0.188) (0.988) (0.922)    
R&D_C_no     0.970*** 0.643*** 3.786*** 2.874 *** 
     (0.134)  (0.083) (0.503) (0.472) 
R&D_C_first     0.711 1.122*** 3.283* 6.243 *** 
     (0.524)  (0.349) (1.757) (2.335) 
R&D_C_frequent     1.087** 0.504 6.684*** 5.234 *** 
     (0.519)  (0.397) (1.946) (1.657) 
R&D_Dif 0.392 0.590*** 4.281*** 3.723***    
 (0.274) (0.218) (1.153) (0.996)    
R&D_Dif_first     1.344** 1.604*** 3.406 6.682 *** 
     (0.695) (0.460) (2.147) (1.611) 
R&D_Dif_frequent     0.654 0.938** 5.687*** 4.777 *** 
     (0.549) (0.393) (1.854) (1.302) 
ln(Sales) 0.562** 0.838*** -0.760 1.257 0.095* 0.501** 0.754 2.099 ** 
 (0.227) (0.169) (0.831) (0.820) (0.228) (0.197) (0.764) (0.850) 
ln(Sales)^2 -0.022 -0.062* -0.173 -0.452*** -0.051 -0.078** -0.252* -0.470 *** 
 (0.044) (0.035) (0.140) (0.145) (0.048) (0.036) (0.135) (0.141) 
ln(Patent_stock) 0.345*** 0.224*** 1.063*** 0.793*** 0.224** 0.133** 0.517* 0.471 * 
 (0.088) (0.062) (0.282) (0.293) (0.095) (0.058) (0.276) (0.263)  
Cooperation (d) 1.739*** 1.070*** 3.390*** 3.604*** 1.308*** 0.710*** 2.829** 3.380 *** 
 (0.313) (0.238) (0.998) (1.152) (0.378) (0.257) (1.149) (1.214)  
East (d) -1.299*** -0.755*** -3.722*** -3.345** -1.648*** -0.986*** -4.981*** -4.339 *** 
 (0.380) (0.293) (1.344) (1.414) (0.406) (0.285) (1.291) (1.426) 
Constant -9.091*** -6.788*** -1.472 -4.783* -6.209*** -4.807*** -5.884* -7.833 ** 
 (0.958) (0.623) (2.987) (2.818) (1.112) (0.698) (3.338) (3.233) 
Industry: Wald chi2(5) 13.26** 31.06*** 13.16** 26.18*** 4.06 7.84 6.24 10.56 * 
Year: Wald chi2(11) 43.33*** 52.46*** 34.20*** 46.91*** 48.97*** 50.37*** 40.69*** 50.14 *** 
Test on equality of coefficients: chi2(1)        
R&D_C=R&D_Dif 1.99 6.13** 0.66 1.28   
R&D_C_first=R&D_C_no     0.24 1.90 0.09 2.13 
R&D_C_freq=R&D_C_no     0.05 0.13 2.15 2.08 
R&D_C_first=R&D_C_freq     0.25 1.51 1.62 0.13 
R&D_C_first=R&D_Dif_first     1.29 1.78 0.00 0.05 
R&D_C_freq=R&D_Dif_freq     0.78 2.65 0.18 0.07 
R&D_Dif_first=R&D_Dif_freq     0.61 1.27 0.66 0.88 
Pseudo/adjusted R2 0.02  0.03 0.01 0.01  0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01  
Wald chi2 250.46*** 381.08*** 147.92*** 151.94.***  333.27*** 420.07*** 163.08*** 152.39 *** 
No. of obs. 3,942  3,540 3,942 3,540  3,718 3,335 3,718 3,335  
Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are shown. Counterfactuals are firms with no DPF. For treated firms: R&D_C equals the counterfactual ln(total R&D), R&D_Dif is the treatment effect on ln(total 
R&D expenditures). For counterfactual firms: R&D_C is the observed ln(R&D), R&D_Dif equals zero. For regressions with share of sales with market novelties as dependent variable the corresponding R&D intensities are 
used. *** (**, *) indicates significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Standard errors are clustered by firm and bootstrapped based on 200 replications.  
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The same analysis is conducted for the three groups of firms receiving different amounts of 
DPF grants (Table 7). Compared to not subsidized firms, firms who are recipients of large 
grants tend to translate the “counterfactual” R&D expenditures more effectively into 
innovation output. For the three types of DPF recipients the positive impact of their 
“counterfactual” R&D on the output is statistically the same. In addition, no differences in the 
effective use of the public grant and the induced R&D are detected between the three groups.  
Table 7: Subsidy effects on firm’s R&D output – depending on DPF grant size 
 
Sales with market novelties 
(in € million, in ln) 
Share of sales with market novelties
(in %) 
 t+1 t+2 t+1 t+2 
Variable       
R&D_C_no 1.041*** 0.646***  4.019 *** 3.290 *** 
 (0.137) (0.084)  (0.509)  (0.495)  
R&D_C_small 1.208*** 0.649***  4.746 *** 5.454 *** 
 (0.391) (0.252)  (1.367)  (1.250)  
R&D_C_medium 1.058*** 0.572*  5.925 *** 7.466 *** 
 (0.388) (0.305)  (1.294)  (1.473)  
R&D_C_large 0.872* 1.030***  6.959 *** 6.185 *** 
 (0.510) (0.268)  (1.319)  (1.041)  
R&D_Dif_small 0.928* 1.058***  5.052 *** 5.917 *** 
 (0.557) (0.360)  (1.761)  (1.134)  
R&D_Dif_medium 1.350*** 0.919***  6.249 *** 6.734 *** 
 (0.457) (0.333)  (1.454)  (1.651)  
R&D_Dif_large 0.437 1.077***  4.871 ** 4.678 *** 
 (0.577) (0.344)  (2.027)  (1.651)  
ln(Sales) -0.037 0.503***  0.772  2.596 *** 
 (0.228) (0.184)  (0.822)  (0.876)  
ln(Sales)^2 -0.039 -0.081**  -0.256 * -0.520 *** 
 (0.042) (0.035)  (0.143)  (0.140)  
ln(Patent_stock) 0.199** 0.135**  0.558 ** 0.358  
 (0.086) (0.061)  (0.278)  (0.257)  
Cooperation (d) 1.274*** 0.750***  1.975 * 2.456 ** 
 (0.362) (0.255)  (1.132)  (1.147)  
East (d) -1.712*** -1.021***  -5.226 *** -4.643 *** 
 (0.403) (0.318)  (1.314)  (1.504)  
Constant -5.547*** -4.672***  -5.414 ** -8.556 *** 
 (0.917) (0.665)  (2.634)  (2.924)  
Industry: Wald chi2(5) 4.62 15.33***  7.01  14.90 ** 
Year: Wald chi2(11) 45.69*** 36.40***  37.23 *** 42.44 *** 
Test on equality of coefficients: chi2(1)       
R&D_C_small=R&D_C_no 0.19 0.00  0.30  3.27 * 
R&D_C_medium=R&D_C_no 0.00 0.06  2.10  7.66 *** 
R&D_C_large=R&D_C_no 0.12 2.11  4.63 ** 8.31 *** 
R&D_C_small=R&D_Dif_small 0.45 2.37  0.03  0.17  
R&D_C_medium=R&D_Dif_med. 0.81 2.58  0.05  0.19  
R&D_C_large=R&D_Dif_large 1.23 0.03  1.00  0.98  
R&D_C_small=R&D_C_large 0.39 1.24  1.66  0.24  
R&D_Dif_small=R&D_Dif_large 0.42 0.00  0.01  0.39  
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.04 0.02  0.02 
Wald chi2 364.39*** 507.63*** 225.27 *** 181.26 *** 
No. of obs. 3,924 3,528 3,924  3,528 
Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are shown. Counterfactuals are firms with no DPF. For 
treated firms: R&D_C equals the counterfactual ln(total R&D), R&D_Dif is the treatment effect on ln(total R&D 
expenditures). For counterfactual firms: R&D_C is the observed ln(R&D), R&D_Dif equals zero. For 
regressions with share of sales with market novelties as dependent variable the corresponding R&D intensities 
are used. *** (**, *) indicates significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Standard errors are clustered by firm and 
bootstrapped based on 200 replications. 
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The control variables are in line with previous empirical findings. Firm’s overall sales tend to 
have an inverse U-shaped impact on sales with market novelties although this effect is not 
always significant. The lagged patent stock as an indicator of past successful R&D increases 
sales with new products in the subsequent period. In addition, access to external knowledge 
with means of cooperation helps to increase innovative output. Firms located in the Eastern 
part of Germany are less successful in the generation and sales of market novelties. 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper the effects of public R&D grants on both the input and output of R&D activities 
are analyzed empirically. The knowledge about the grant size enables me to differentiate 
between partial crowding-out, additionality and no effect on R&D input. Based on these 
results the contribution of subsidies on R&D output is investigated. In the analysis I allow for 
heterogeneous effect in terms of two dimensions: firm’s DPF history and DPF grant size. This 
paper contributes to understanding the effectiveness of DPF grants in stimulating private 
R&D and producing innovations. 
Using a sample of about 4,000 German firms a non-parametric matching approach with 
multiple treatments is applied to firstly estimate the effects of public R&D subsidies on a 
firm’s R&D input for different types of firms with respect to funding experience and grant 
size. For both first-time and frequent participants in the DPF scheme, full and partial 
substitution of privately-financed R&D expenditures by the subsidy can be ruled out on 
average. For frequent DPF recipients a stimulation of private R&D spending is found which 
can be attributed to the receipt of the grant. For first-time DPF participants no such effect can 
be observed. The findings suggest that firms experienced in receiving public R&D support 
and receiving grants over a longer period of time are able and also willing to increase their 
R&D efforts. This may be attributed to planning security effects that allow these firms to 
increase the level of risk, and thus also their private R&D investments. In terms of a firm’s 
R&D output, the grant effect (i.e. the grant plus the private R&D expenditure induced by the 
grant) attributes to innovation success to the same extent as the “counterfactual” R&D (i.e. 
R&D expenditure less the grant and the induced private R&D) does. In addition, subsidy-
related R&D is used equally efficiently by both first-time and frequent participants in terms of 
the generation of new to the market products. Overall no evidence is found that supporting the 
same firms leads to a lower effectiveness of the instrument. Although firms that received 
funding in the past are more likely to be selected for public funding again, this selection does 
not seem to have a negative impact on input and output effects. 
Furthermore, this paper provides evidence on the role of grant size on firm’s R&D. Small 
grants do not exhibit a significant effect on company-financed R&D expenditures. The results 
suggest that grants should have a minimum size to cause an impact on a firm’s privately 
financed R&D. In contrast, medium- and large-scale grants increase firm’s R&D spending. 
These findings suggest that firms indeed face financial constraints in particular for costly 
R&D projects firms. Since R&D expenditures often lack collaterals due to their intangible 
nature, usually these activities need to be financed with internal resources. The subsidy is 
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therefore needed to realize the project. Another explanation is that the risk of a successful 
completion or market uncertainty of larger projects is too high for firms. Subsidies mitigate 
these issues since they directly reduce the costs. Czarnitzki and Toole (2007) provide 
empirical evidence for this relationship between subsidies and market uncertainty. 
Remarkably in terms of the generated innovation output by publicly induced R&D, the 
effectiveness of small grants is the same as for larger grants. 
Overall positive effects of DPF grants on R&D input and also on output are found. The policy 
goal of increasing the investment in R&D is certainly achieved. However, not every grant has 
the same effect. The analysis provides evidence that (at least) the effect varies by a firm’s 
history of receiving subsidies and by grant size. Besides the necessity of a minimum grant 
size, the effect of private R&D is higher for frequent participants. In addition, publicly 
induced money is translated into new products as effectively as privately financed R&D. 
The results suggest that the government is successful in selecting projects which the firms 
would not have conducted without the grant. However, in recent years a trend towards the 
allocation of smaller grants can be observed, even in nominal terms. While in the mid-nineties 
the median grant equaled 61,000 euros in the population of DPF grants, ten years later the 
median grant consists of 42,000 euros. The results of the study suggest that the grants should 
not become too small in order to achieve stimulating effects.  
Limitations and future research 
Various caveats should be taken into account regarding the results. The change in R&D 
spending before and after receiving a DPF grant could be compared between the matched 
groups. In practice the duration of the grant – on average three years – would also have to be 
taken into account. For instance, if a firm already receives grants for a project for two years 
the privately-financed R&D expenditures in the preceding year might already be affected by 
the grant. It would be necessary to look at the expenditures before the first year of funding. 
Long time-series data would be required to perform such an analysis.  
In cases where no effect on firm-financed R&D is observed, a re-allocation of private R&D 
expenditures within a firm still might have occurred since the projects are usually subsidized 
only up to 50 percent. The firm-financed share of the subsidized projects might be re-directed 
towards the funded project and not invested in other R&D projects. Alternatively, the funded 
project has been on the research agenda of the firm anyway but is extended in size due to the 
subsidy. Shifts of money on the project level are not regarded in this study since the aim of 
the government is to increase firms’ overall R&D activities.  
Most of the given DPF grants are part of a collaborative project. Already in the 1980s, the 
government began to fund projects conducted by consortia rather than individual firms. 90 
percent of the DPF firms in the sample have at least one joint project, often with universities 
or other public research institutions. The part of the project conducted by other partners than 
the observed firm is not incorporated in the analysis although it might have an impact on 
R&D spending and also on the success of such a project as it is known from the literature on 
R&D co-operation in general. As an approximation for the second issue a dummy variable 
indicating whether a firm cooperates in its R&D activities – not necessarily in the subsidized 
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project – is included in the estimation and it indeed increases R&D output. However, this 
relationship needs to be elaborated more precisely in further research.  
This study investigated the effects depending on the absolute grant size. It would be 
interesting to also study the role of the relative grant size. It is conceivable that the grants 
should not be too high compared to previous R&D since the elasticity of R&D might be 
restricted. 
DPF grants can have more effects than only the direct impact on the funded firm. Due to the 
nature of R&D, the funded firm cannot fully appropriate the results of the R&D project. Some 
knowledge generated within the publicly funded and induced R&D will spill over to other 
firms. A recent analysis for Germany conducted by Peters et al. (2009) shows that these 
indirect returns are even slightly higher than the direct, private returns and therefore not 
negligible. But negative effects on other firms also might occur, for example, due to 
competition distortion or a rise in wages for R&D employees. In addition, the instrument is 
accompanied with costs. Institutions responsible for the allocation of the grants need to be 
maintained. Costs are also involved on the company side for the application. A welfare 
analysis of the instrument which considers these issues is still lacking. I leave these questions 
to be explored in future research. 
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Appendix A 
Table 8: Matching protocol  
Step 1 Specify and estimate a multinomial probit model to obtain the propensity scores 
[ 0 1ˆ ˆ ˆ( ), ( ),..., ( )MN N NP x P x P x ].  
Step 2 Restrict sample to common support: delete all observations whose probability is larger than the 
smallest maximum and smaller than the largest minimum of all subsamples defined by S. 
Step 3 Estimate the counterfactual expectations of the outcome variables. 
For a given value of m and l, the following steps are performed: 
 (a)  Choose one observation in the subsample defined by participation in m and delete it from that 
pool. 
 (b) Find an observation in the subsample of participants in l that has the same value for Sub_EU, 
Sub_regional and year as the one chosen in Step (a) and is as close as possible to the one chosen 
in terms of [ ˆ ˆ( ), ( ),m lN NP x P x x? ], with x?  being a vector containing ln(employees) and 
ln(patent_stock_dev). Closeness is based on the Mahalanobis distance. Do not remove the 
selected controls from the pool of potential controls, so that it can be used again. 
 (c) Repeat a) and b) until no participant in m is left. 
 (d) Using the matched comparison group formed in (c), compute the respective conditional 
expectation by the sample mean. Note that the same observation may appear more than once in 
that group. 
Step 4 Repeat Step (3) for all combinations of m and l. 
Step 5 Compute the estimate of the treatment effect using the results of Step 4. For statistical inference 
correct the standard errors using the approximation by Lechner (2001) since sampling with 
replacement is applied. 
Note: Protocol is based on Gerfin and Lechner, 2002. 
Table 9: Summary statistics of control variables 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Sub_EU 0.097 0.297 0 1 
Sub_regional 0.207 0.405 0 1 
ln(Employees) 4.537 1.567 0 8.517 
ln(Age) 2.722 1.211 -0.693 5.318 
R&D_con 0.716 0.451 0 1 
Qualification 24.191 25.396 0 100 
Ln(Patent_stock_dev) -3.221 2.511 -4.987 5.244 
Group_national 0.390 0.488 0 1 
Group_foreign 0.115 0.319 0 1 
East 0.327 0.469 0 1 
Low tech ma. 0.098 0.298 0 1 
Medium-low tech ma. 0.235 0.424 0 1 
Medium-high tech ma. 0.333 0.471 0 1 
High tech ma. 0.165 0.371 0 1 
Low tech services 0.081 0.272 0 1 
High tech services 0.089 0.284 0 1 
Note: 8,528 obs. Year variables are not shown. 
 
 Table 10: Estimation results for the propensity scores 
 DPF  DPF history  DPF size 
 Probit  Multinomial probit  Multinomial probit 
    First Frequent  Small Medium Large  
dy/dx (Std.Err.)  dy/dx (Std.Err.) dy/dx (Std.Err.)  dy/dx (Std.Err.) dy/dx (Std.Err.) dy/dx (Std.Err.)
Sub_EU° 0.122***  0.022** 0.050***  0.028*** 0.032*** 0.046*** 
 (0.020)  (0.010) (0.011)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Sub_regional° 0.062***  0.008 0.019***  0.023*** 0.021*** 0.013*** 
 (0.013)  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) 
ln(Employees) 0.026***  0.009*** 0.006***  0.007*** 0.005** 0.010*** 
 (0.004)  (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ln(Age) 0.003  -0.002 0.002  -0.001 0.003 0.000 
 (0.004)  (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
R&D_con° 0.069***  0.023*** 0.014***  0.022*** 0.029*** 0.016*** 
 (0.009)  (0.004) (0.003)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
Qualification 0.002***  0.001*** 0.000***  0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Patent_stock_dev 0.013***  0.003*** 0.004***  0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 
 (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Group_national° -0.014  -0.005 -0.001  -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 
 (0.009)  (0.005) (0.003)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
Group_foreign° -0.014  -0.013** 0.002  -0.008 -0.011* 0.004 
 (0.014)  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
East° 0.006  0.006 0.004  -0.001 0.002 0.004 
 (0.012)  (0.005) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
Medium-low tech ma.° -0.007  -0.013* 0.020  0.004 -0.017** 0.009 
 (0.019)  (0.007) (0.013)  (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) 
Medium-high tech ma.° 0.016  -0.005 0.023**  0.011 -0.003 0.010 
 (0.019)  (0.008) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) 
High tech ma.° 0.065***  -0.000 0.063**  0.018 0.008 0.040** 
 (0.027)  (0.009) (0.025)  (0.014) (0.012) (0.019) 
Low tech services° -0.017  -0.015* 0.010  -0.003 -0.009 -0.001 
 (0.022)  (0.008) (0.013)  (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) 
High tech services° -0.006  -0.011 0.027  -0.020** -0.007 0.021 
 (0.024)  (0.008) (0.020)  (0.008) (0.011) (0.016) 
Wald chi2 all 573.83*** 553.82***  696.82*** 
Log likelihood -2,671.69 -2,272.33  -3,804.64
Mc Fadden's R2 0.196   
No. ob obs. 8,528 8,108  8,528
Note: ° dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. *** (**, *) indicate significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Standard errors are clustered by firm. Sector and year dummy variables 
are included in the regressions but not shown. Base categories in all estimations are firms with no DPF. 
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Different possibilities exist for the estimation of the propensity scores which enter the 
matching algorithm. Either multinomial choice models can be applied to obtain the 
probabilities of each treatment or conditional probabilities based on the subsample of 
participants in m and l are used. In order to identify the average treatment effect, it is 
sufficient to use information from the subsample of participants in m and l (Lechner, 2002). 
Lechner compares the two types of approaches and concludes that no approach is superior to 
the other per se. However, using propensity scores on the basis of the multinomial probit 
model inherent the risk that if one choice equation is misspecified, all conditional 
probabilities could be misspecified. Thus, as a robustness check the effects are calculated on 
estimations of the conditional probabilities between the pairs of choices directly with means 
of probit models. This estimation strategy is similar to the one used in the context of binary 
treatments. Since this approach produces a lot of probit models – three models for the analysis 
of the DPF history and six of the grant size – the probit results are not presented. Overall the 
results are very similar to those of the corresponding multinomial models. The resulting 
effects depending on DPF history and DPF size are shown in Table 11. Due to the less 
restrictive common support which is based only on the two treatments under analysis more 
observations are used. 
Table 11: Average treatment effects on the treated – propensity scores based on probit 
models 
  Outcome variable  
Treated (m) Control (l) ln(private R&D) ln(private R&Dint) No. of matched pairs 
DPF history     
First DPF No DPF 0.234 0.144 330 
Frequent DPF No DPF 0.371** 0.284** 354 
Frequent DPF First DPF 0.298 0.223 273 
     
DPF size     
Small DPF No DPF 0.142 0.119 370 
Medium DPF No DPF 0.325** 0.244** 368 
Large DPF No DPF 0.509*** 0.313*** 356 
Medium DPF Small DPF 0.159 0.043 326 
Large DPF Small DPF 0.714*** 0.457*** 303 
Large DPF Medium DPF 0.358** 0.065 327 
Note: Average treatment effects on the treated (αm,l) are shown. *** (**, *) indicates significance level of 1% 
(5%, 10%) of the two-sided t-tests on mean equality between the treatment group m and the selected control 
group l. The standard errors of the t-statistics are based on the approximation by Lechner (2001) that accounts 
for sampling with replacement in the selected control group. All control variables as well as the propensity score 
are not significantly different between the two groups after matching. Sub_EU, Sub_regional and year variables 
are exact matches. 
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As a robustness check the analysis is repeated for a subsample of firms who do not receive 
subsidies from other sources, such as the EU or regional level. Hence, only firms who only 
receive DPF or no financial support are included in this subsample. Thus, these results are not 
biased due to other funding. But due to the exclusion of firms with support from other sources 
the number of observations decreased substantially. The subsample consists of 6,405 
observations, instead of 8,528 observations (-25%). In particular the number of DPF 
participants decreased since these firms also receive funding from other sources (-49%). Since 
the probability of getting other funds is also higher for frequent recipients and firms with 
larger grants, the number of frequent and large recipients even decreases by 61 percent and 57 
percent respectively. Thus, one has to bear in mind that in particular these groups might not 
represent the population of DPF recipients very well.  
Table 12: Average treatment effects on the treated for the subsample of firms – no 
receipt of subsidies from EU or regional level 
  Outcome variable  
Treated (m) Control (l) ln(private R&D) ln(private R&Dint) No. of matched pairs 
Whole sample     
With DPF No DPF 0.454*** 0.371*** 573 
     
DPF history     
First DPF No DPF 0.249 0.241 194 
Frequent DPF No DPF 0.401* 0.431** 141 
Frequent DPF First DPF 0.346 0.399** 126 
     
DPF size     
Small DPF No DPF 0.217 0.184 202  
Medium DPF No DPF 0.355* 0.319** 185 
Large DPF No DPF 0.712*** 0.457*** 159 
Medium DPF Small DPF 0.293 0.170 180 
Large DPF Small DPF 0.809*** 0.215 155 
Large DPF Medium DPF 0.408* 0.188 147 
Note: Firms who receive subsidies from the EU or regional level are dropped. Average treatment effects on the 
treated (αm,l) are shown. *** (**, *) indicates significance level of 1% (5%, 10%) of the two-sided t-tests on 
mean equality between the treatment group m and the selected control group l. The standard errors of the t-
statistics are based on the approximation by Lechner (2001) that accounts for sampling with replacement in the 
selected control group. All control variables as well as the propensity score are not significantly different 
between the two groups after matching. Sub_EU, Sub_regional and year variables are exact matches. 
